Liabilities of Independent Directors and Non-Executive Directors under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

We would like to start by examining the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as "the act"). Per the maxim "generalia specialibus non derogant" the provisions of this act will supersede the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. However, the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as "the IPC"), being a penal statute, concurrent charges may be framed under both acts.

The   Directors  stand   in  a  fiduciary position with the company and are expected to manage the affairs of the company in a manner beneficial tothe interest of the company and its stakeholder. Director’s  liability arisesbecause of their position as agents or officers of the Company as     also for being  in  the position of trustees  or having fiduciary relation  with theCompany  or   its   shareholders.    Nonexecutive   directors    (NEDs) or independent directors (IDs) are those not charged with   the   day  to day affairs and management  of  the  company  and   are  usually involved in the planning and decision making activities.

The concept of Independent Directors has assumed great significance due to various corporate frauds which have been unveiled in the recent past.  Regulation 17 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations & Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 mandates appointment of Independent Directors on the Board of Directors of all the listed entities. The term “Independent Director” has been defined under the Companies Act, 2013. The requirements prescribed under the Companies Act. 2013 seems to be much more stringent than that of SEBI (LODR) Regulations, 2015.

As per Section 2 (47) of the Companies Act, 2013, “Independent Director” means and independent director referred to in Sub Section (6) of Section 149 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Section 141 of the act talks about when a company commits the offence mentioned in Section 138. It very specifically deems every person who oversaw and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business to be deemed guilty.

However, if the said act was committed without his knowledge then he will not be held under this clause. A substantial point of difference between this and the provisions of the IPC is that under Sections 34 and 149 of the IPC, an element of mens rea (being in furtherance of common intention and in furtherance of common object respectively) is present which is absent as a requirement in the provisions of the act. Section 141 only talks about knowledge and not mens rea.

Under section 141 of the N I Act, apart from   the   company   itself,   the following persons are deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished:  

·        Every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of   the business of the company;  

·        Any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company  with whose consent and connivance, the offence under section 138 had been committed;  

·        Any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company whose negligence has attributed to the offence under section 138 being committed by the company 

In Rohit Chauhan Mehta v Gujarat State Fertilizer Co.,the Gujarat High Court rejected the application made by the accusedfordropping the proceedings initiated under section 141 of NI Act.   The accused included the NEDs as well. The learned counsel  appearing for the accused submitted that the whole body of directors of a  company cannot be said to be in charge of the daytoday management

and running of the business of the company and cannot be attributed knowledge of everyday working of the company and, therefore, cannot be impleaded for prosecution. 

The   application was rejected on the submissions of the learned counsel

representing the complainant that in view of the admitted well‐known sickness of  the  accused  company  to  such an extent that its entire networth was wiped out and it was declared sick by the B.I.F.R. In the year 1993, it was not open for the directors to contend that the cheques to the tune   of Rs.5  crores could have been issued against supply of raw materials without  the knowledge, consent   and   connivance of the board ofdirectors.  

In S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and another, the question before the Supreme Court in this case  was whether  liability  under section 138 and 141 of the N I Act  arise   on  account  of holding  office  by  the  director   as such. The  Court    held     that   the conditions contained in sec 141 are intended to ensure that a person who is sought to  be made vicariously liable for an offence of which the principal accused  is the Company, had a role to play in relaltion to the incirminating  act and further that such a person should know what is attributed to him to make him liable.

The conclusion is inevitable that the liability arises on account of conduct,act or omission on the part of a person and not merely on  account  of   holding   an  office or a position in a company. Various HighCourts have also ruled on similar lines. 

It has been commonly used as a defence in these cases for the directors to state that they are non-executive independent directors and hence they have no say in the day to day matters of the company. (As used in Briji Gopal Daga vs State of Kerala)

It has been held by a plethora of cases that an independent director, by the very nature of his appointment, is deemed not to have any knowledge of the day to day matters of the Company.

Coming back to Section 141 of the act, a charge will also be framed by necessary implication on all persons deemed to be involved in the day to day matters of the company. Hence, a plain averment to the fact that the director is involved in the day to day matters of the company should be enough to justify accusing him.

Per the Supreme Court in K.K. Ahuja vs V.K. Vora & Another, the position under Section 141 of the act can be summarized thus:

(i) If the accused is the Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, it is not necessary to make an averment in the complaint that he oversees, and is responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company. It is sufficient if an averment is made that the accused was the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director at the relevant time. This is because the prefix “Managing” to the word “Director” makes it clear that they oversaw and are responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company.

(ii) In the case of a Director or an officer of the company who signed the cheque on behalf of the company, there is no need to make a specific averment that he oversaw and was responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company or make any specific allegation about consent connivance or negligence. The very fact that the dishonoured cheque was signed by him on behalf of the company, would give rise to responsibility under sub-section (2) of Section 141 of the act.

(iii) In the case of a Director, secretary or manager [as defined in Section 2(24) of the Companies Act, 1956] or a person referred to in clauses (e) and (f) of Section 5 of Companies Act, 1956, an averment in the complaint that he oversaw, and was responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company is necessary to bring the case under Section 141(1) of the act. No further averment would be necessary in the complaint, though some will be desirable. They can also be made liable under Section 141(2) of the act by making necessary averments relating to consent and connivance or negligence, in the complaint, to bring the matter under that sub-section.

(iv) Other officers of a company cannot be made liable under sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the act. Other officers of a company can be made liable only under sub-section (2) of Section 141 of the act, by averring in the complaint their position and duties in the company and their role regarding the issue and dishonour of the cheque, disclosing consent, connivance or negligence.

A detailed scrutiny was also done by the Supreme Court recently in Standard Chartered Bank v Bank of Maharashtra which reflects the same. The main issue is that the averments made in the complaint should be adequate for the magistrate to issue process. This is automatically done if he is the managing director or the signing director of the cheque. Otherwise in all other cases, the accused should be said to oversee and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.

The best defence for a person in such a case is to state that he was an independent director and had no knowledge of the said cheque.

Comparing Section 141 of the act with Sections 34 and 149 of the IPC, we can see that the vicarious liability provisions are stricter in the act and, as mentioned above, the maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant will apply here excluding the jurisdiction of sections 34 and 149 of the IPC. 

            Jaydeep Mehta

            Designated Partner

            Lexstreet Advisors LLP                          

            Advocates & Solicitors.

            Mumbai / Gujarat & New Delhi

            Email : jaydeep.mehta@outlook.com

            Cell : +91 9824099514

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"Societal morality changes with time," says the court.

On Monday, The Supreme Court referred to a larger Bench a writ petition filed by five petitioners to quash Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code which criminalises homosexuality.

On Monday, the Supreme Court said a section of people cannot live in fear of the law which atrophies their right to choice and natural sexual inclinations. It said societal morality changes with time and law should walk and change pace with life.
 

A three-judge Bench led by Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra decided to revisit its December 2013 verdict in Suresh Kumar Kaushal vs. Naz Foundation which dismissed the LGBT community as a negligible part of the population while virtually denying them the right of choice and sexual orientation.

While the court noted that Section 377 punishes carnal intercourse against order of nature, it added that "the determination of order of nature is not a common phenomenon. Individual autonomy and individual natural inclination cannot be atrophied unless the restrictions are determined as reasonable."

The court observed that what is natural for one may not be natural for the other, but the confines of law cannot trample or curtail the inherent rights embedded with an individual under Article 21 (right to life) of the Constitution.

The court said the concept of consensual sex may require more protection. The court noted the arguments of senior advocate Arvind Datar, who appeared for the petitioners, that Section 377 IPC is not a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right to choice.

Its judgments emphasising the transgender identity in the NALSA case and the observations made by a nine-judge Bench in the right to privacy case upholding the right to sexual orientation and choice of sexual partners warrant a relook into its dismissive verdict in the Naz case, said the court.

Initiallym the Bench seemed reluctant, saying a five judge Bench is already considering a curative petition by Naz against 2013 verdict.

Mr. Datar, however prevailed, saying while Naz is an NGO, he is representing petitioners whose fundamental rights are directly affected by Section 377.

"Right to choose my partner is part of my fundamental right to privacy," Mr. Datar submitted.

"But the privacy judgment says sexual partner means a natural partner," Chief Justice Misra countered.

"Who my 'natural' partner should be is my choice," Mr. Datar responded.

Chief Justice Misra then said Section 377 also criminalises beastiality. "What about carnal intercourse with animals?" the CJI asked.

"We are not on that part. Our petition is only about criminalising consensual sex between adults of the same sex," Mr. Datar replied.

The court at one point observed that a provision cannot become unconstitutional purely because it is abused. The senior advocate argued that Section 377 has the potential to destroy individual choice and sexual orientation.

The petitioners include Navtej Singh Johar, a Sangeet Natak Akademi Award-winning Bharatnatyam dancer; Sunil Mehra who is a senior journalist; Ritu Dalmia who is a restaurateur and Aman Nath, an expert on Indian art, culture and the founder of the Neemrana chain of hotels.

"The petitioners are not seeking protection only as sexual minorities but recognition of characteristics that inhere to all human beings. A right to sexuality, sexual autonomy and freedom to choose a sexual partner forms the cornerstone of human dignity which is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution," the petition said.

The nine-judge Bench of the Supreme Court had in August 2017 ripped apart its 2013 judgment upholding Section 377.

The majority privacy judgment had observed that the chilling effect of Section 377 “poses a grave danger to the unhindered fulfilment of one’s sexual orientation, as an element of privacy and dignity.”

In separate judgments, the Constitution Bench had concluded that the 2013 verdict by a two-judge Bench of the apex court pandered to a “majoritarian” view to turn down the LGBT community their inherent fundamental rights of life, personal liberty, equality and gender discrimination.

The 2013 judgment's view that “a miniscule fraction of the country’s population constitutes lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgenders” was not a sustainable basis to deny the right to privacy, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud had observed in his majority judgment.

“The test of popular acceptance does not furnish a valid basis to disregard rights which are conferred with the sanctity of constitutional protection. Discrete and insular minorities face grave dangers of discrimination for the simple reason that their views, beliefs or way of life does not accord with the ‘mainstream’. Yet in a democratic Constitution founded on the rule of law, their rights are as sacred as those conferred on other citizens to protect their freedoms and liberties,” Justice Chandrachud had observed.

Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, in his separate judgment, seconded Justice Chandrachud, while observing that the “majoritarian concept” does not apply to constitutional rights.

“Courts are often called up on to take what may be categorized as a non-majoritarian view... One's sexual orientation is undoubtedly an attribute of privacy,” Justice Kaul added.

Justice Chandrachud observed that the Supreme Court, without any constitutional basis, had set aside the historic Delhi High Court judgment of then Chief Justice A.P. Shah. The High Court had in 2010 found that Section 377 was a statutory provision targeting homosexuals as a class and amounted to a hostile discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation.

The Review Bench of the Supreme Court, in January 2014, had agreed with its original appeal judgment on December 11, 2013, setting aside the historic and globally accepted verdict of the Delhi High Court.

The pending curative petitions are the last stand in a decade-old fight by the LGBT community.

President Donald Trump said he plans to postpone his fake awards show for fake news to Wednesday, January 17, from Monday, January 8 — just in case you thought things couldn’t get any sillier. Guess the president doesn’t want to be overshadowed by the Golden Globes.

The “Fake News Awards,” as Trump calls it, are going to “the most corrupt & biased of the Mainstream Media.”

Trump initially announced his intention to name “THE MOST DISHONEST & CORRUPT MEDIA AWARDS OF THE YEAR” (all caps emphasis his) on Tuesday, January 2 - the same day he fired off multiple confounding tweets, including an alarming threat at North Korea that was apparently prompted by a segment on Fox News.

Justice ministry of France plans to install landline phones in prison cells in an ambitious attempt to improve rehabilitation rates and reduce rampant mobile phone trafficking behind bars. The justice ministry said on Tuesday it had called for bids to operate the service after successful tests at one prison since 2016.

But inmates’ new freedom to call up to four pre-approved numbers at any time of the day will not come cheap, with one prisoner advocacy group warning that calls could cost up to 80 cents ($0.97) a minute.

France has struggled against the smuggling of mobile phones into prisons, like other countries. More than 19,000 handsets and accessories were seized in the first half of 2017, for an overall prisoner population of about 70,000. The ambitious move will reduce tensions.

“There have always been call boxes in prisons, but the inmates need to be accompanied by personnel, which requires time and availability. It gets complicated,” the justice ministry said.

Prison solves problem of illegal mobile phones

In the month of July 2016, a prison in Montmédy, north-eastern France, installed phones in every cell, which led to a 31% drop in the number of illicit mobile phone seizures in the first half of last year compared with a year earlier.“The phones have eased tensions inside the prison,” the ministry said. “It helps with civil reintegration by maintaining family ties,” it added, saying the goal was to “cut cellphone trafficking”.

“Sometimes, an inmate will have four people in line in front of him for the phone in the hall. But when it’s his turn, it’s time to be back in the cell. Things get tense,” said Christopher Dorangeville, the head of the CGT Penitentiaries union.

In newspaper report of Le Monde, telecom operators would place bids in the coming days to install the phones in 50,000 cells at 178 prisons across France, starting at the end of the year. The operator must finance the installation costs, and would make its money by charging prisoners for calls.

A French advocacy group, The International Prison Observatory,  welcomed the move. “A phone in each cell allows a degree of intimacy when speaking with family members,” said the NGO’s François Bes. “More importantly, the fact that you can call when you want can let them speak with children after school.”

“The problem is the high cost of talking. Currently a call costs about 80 cents a minute,” Bes said. Even after the cost was renegotiated at Montmédy, down to about 65 cents, “that’s still way too expensive for most inmates,” he added.

It has become clear now that the outcome of the EU referendum on June 23 is that UK should be set apart from the EU. After this made clear, now it's time to have a look at the implications on the employment law in the UK and how law firms in London would deal with this change.

Parliament is not legally destined by the result of the referendum, but it seems highly improbable that there would be any action. Certainly, the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, has already assured that Brexit will go as planned - further indicated by her appointment of a Secretary of State for Exiting the EU in David Davis.

In order to separate from the EU, the UK will have to inform the European Council of its decision in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union. This step has not yet been taken - David Cameron indicated that it wouldn't happen before the new Prime Minister had been appointed. We shall now have to wait and see what Theresa May proposes as to the next steps.

There will be no immediate impact on UK legislation. At present all UK legislation, whether EU-derived or not, remains in place.

The future influence of Brexit on the legislation will rely on the terms of its future relationship with the EU, which is doubtful to become clearer until the end of the year. However, in theory, the withdrawal will enable the UK to repeal or modify any UK employment legislation derived from EU law.

Withdrawal will also make an impact on the standing of European Court rulings on employment concerns. Past decisions of the UK courts which have followed European decisions will remain binding on them - employment tribunals won't be able to depart from existing case law unless or until there is a change in the underlying legislation. However, future decisions of the European Court won't be binding - although they are still likely to be influential where the UK courts are applying the EU-derived law which is retained.

The free movement and working rights of EU citizens, for the time being, would also remain intact. As recently guaranteed by the Cabinet Office in a press release, the referendum has not changed the rights or status of EU citizens currently living and working in the UK or those of UK nationals in the EU.

It is necessary for law firms in London to keep abreast of these changes while adopting a new case of the employment matter. A careful and through a look at these changes would result into the precise handling of those cases.

One of the fastest growing area of criminal activity in America is Juvenile crimes. Juvenile crimes are measured those crimes committed by people who are under the age of eighteen. Juvenile offenders, or “juvenile delinquents,” as they are sometimes referred to, are usually handled differently than adult offenders, but an increasing trend toward harsher sentencing may erode this distinction in the near future.

The Juvenile Justice System

The juvenile justice system strives to rehabilitate and treat juvenile offenders, rather than incarcerate and remove them from society. Depending on the type and seriousness of the offense, and the offender's age and past record of criminal activity, the state may prosecute an individual under the age of eighteen as a juvenile or as an adult. This is usually accomplished through a series of diversion programs, alternative sentencing structures, and even the use of peer run “teen courts” in a number of jurisdictions. On the federal level, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act targets juvenile crimes by assisting state and local governments in providing preventative services to high-risk youths. Additionally, individual states have enacted their own statutes to regulate, punish and prevent juvenile delinquency. 

As distinguished, a rising trend is to treat juvenile offenders as adults more often. If the state tries the minor as a juvenile, the case will be adjudicated in juvenile court. Juvenile courts have specific rules and procedures that are unique to the juvenile law system, and often designed to expedite the process, minimize exposure of the juvenile record to the public, etc. 

The punishment of juvenile offenders also differs significantly from the punishment of adult criminals. Because the juvenile justice system seeks to rehabilitate juvenile delinquents, juvenile courts may impose a variety of flexible sentences, such as rehabilitation programs, payment of restitution to victims, imposition of court-determined curfews, mandatory school attendance, or placement in a juvenile detention facility.

The levels of security in juvenile detention facilities vary depending on the threat that the juvenile poses to the community, with some functioning as group homes while others resemble adult prisons. Even when juveniles are tried as adults, they may still be given the benefit of more lenient juvenile sentencing laws. Conversely, if a crime is serious, juveniles as young as sixteen may be sentenced to adult prisons.

Types of Juvenile Crimes

Juveniles are capable of committing the same crimes as adults, with a few exceptions. On the other hand, some acts are considered delinquent simply because of the offender's status as a minor. These "status" offenses include underage consumption of alcohol, driving without a license, truancy from school and running away from home. Status offenses are typically dealt with by social services agencies and do not require intervention from the juvenile court. Certain other status crimes can expose others to criminal liability, but often not the juveniles themselves.

For illustration, juveniles are usually not considered to be able to consent to sexual acts, so any sex act may result in a statutory rape charge against a person over the age of consent, but generally not against the minor, even if the act was consensual. This can apply to situations where the minor is engaged in prostitution, as well.

More serious offenses may be charged as felonies or misdemeanors. While minors may be involved in all types of crime, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) documents three major categories of juvenile crime: violent crimes, crimes against property and drug-related crimes. Other common juvenile crimes not indexed by the OJJDP, but common examples include loitering, vagrancy, vandalism, and weapons possession. The OJJDP defines violent crimes as those that result in bodily injury (such as assault, rape, and homicide), property crimes as situations where a juvenile uses force, or the threat of force, to obtain the property of another, and drug-related crimes as those involving the possession or sale of illegal narcotics. 

If you or your child has been charged with a crime, it is important to immediately contact a local attorney who is experienced in juvenile crimes. Because the juvenile laws differ from those for adults, not every attorney will be qualified to handle these types of cases. Due to the far reaching consequences of juvenile crime and the increasing tendency to treat these crimes more like adult crimes, it is very important to have the assistance of a qualified attorney.

Introduction:

                        In the event of a decree in favour of the creditor against the principal debtor the wings of the decree can also be extended against the sureties as their liability in coextensive with the principal debtor. A surety is a person who comes forward to pay the amount in the event of the borrower failing to pay the amount .It means that on a default having been made by the principal debtor the creditors can recover from the surety all what he could have recovered from the principal debtor. For instance, the principal debtor makes a default in the payment of a debt of Rs. 10000/-.

Surety:

               A surety is a person who comes forward to pay the amount in the event of the borrower failing to pay the amount. In the event of a decree in favour of the creditor against the principal debtor the wings of the decree can also be extended against the sureties as their liability in coextensive with the principal debtor. But when a suit against the principal debtor was dismissed for default and the decision became final there being no liability surviving against the debtor the surety’s liability gets automatically terminated.

Surety's liability:

                         The liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. The provision that the surety’s liability is coextensive with that of the principal debtor means that his liability is exactly the same as that of the principal debtor. It means that on a default having been made by the principal debtor the creditors can recover from the surety all what he could have recovered from the principal debtor. For instance, the principal debtor makes a default in the payment of a debt of Rs. 10000/-.

Rights against the principal debtor

Rights of subrogation(Section 140):

                                                       When the principal debtor makes a default in the performance of his duty, and on such a default, the surety makes the necessary payment or makes performance of all what he is liable for he becomes invested with all the creditor had against the principal debtor. In other words, the surety steps in to the shoes of the creditor and by an action against the principal debtor, he can recover from him all that, which could have been recovered by the creditor. This is known as surety’s right of subrogation.

 Rights of indemnity against the principal debtor(sec.145):

                                                                                                  In a contract of guarantee, when the principal debtor makes a default, the surety has to make payment to the creditor. This payment is make by the payment to the creditor. This payment is made by him on behalf of the principal debtor. After making such payment, he can recover the same from the principal debtor. Such a claim can be made by the surety only in respect of the sums he has rightfully paid under the guarantee, but not the sums which he has paid wrongfully.

                                               Right against the creditor

Right to securities with the creditor (Section 141):

                                                                                      It has been noted above that after the surety has performed his duty under the contract of guarantee, he is subrogated to all the rights which are available to the creditor against the principal debtor. Section 141 makes a further provision in that regard, according to which a surety is entitled to the benefit of every security which the creditor has against the principal debtor at that time when the contract of surety ship is entered into. It is, however, not necessary that at the time of making the contract, the surety should be aware of the securities which the creditor had.

Loss of securities without creditor’s negligence.

                                                                                  Loss of the securities by the creditor results in the discharge of the surety. If, however, the hypothecated securities are lost without any fault of the creditor, the surety is not discharged thereby.

Securities received by the creditor after the contract of guarantee:

                                                                                                                 It has been noted above that according to section 141, a surety is entitled to the benefit of every security which the creditor has at the time when the contract of surety ship is entered into. It means that the surety has no right to those securities which the creditor obtained from the principal debtor after making the contract of guarantee. Therefore, if the creditor parts with the securities which he had obtained subsequent to the making of the contract of guarantee, the surety will not be discharges as a consequence of the loss of such securities

\Surety has no right to goods in hypothecation.

                                                                               It may be noted that according to section 141, the surety is entitled to the benefit of such good which are with the creditor. It covers situations where the goods are pledged to the creditor and he has the possession of the goods. If  he loses or parts with the goods, the surety is discharged thereby. In case there is hypothecation of the goods, the goods remain in the possession of the goods and there is no question of his losing or parting with the same. If, therefore, hypothecated goods are lost without any fault of the creditor that will not discharge the surety. In other words, since in the case of the hypothecated goods, the creditor does not have the possession of the goods, the surety cannot invoke the provision of section 141 in such case.

Conclusion:   After studying the whole topic we would like to conclude that a surety is a  person who comes forward to pay the amount in the event of the borrower failing to pay the amount. In the event of a decree in favour of the creditor against the principal debtor the wings of the decree can also be extended against the sureties as their liability in coextensive with the principal debtor. The liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. A surety has certain rights against the principal debtor, the creditor and co-sureties.

The decision of the Supreme Court of India, the apex court of the country,  to dismiss the petition filed by Indian National Congress urging it to direct the Election Commission  of India to verify at least 25 percent of the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) with votes cast by citing it without merits,  has sparked off a nationwide debate on the issue. The legal experts from the country,  have now come forward and advocating the universal usage of the VVPAT in all the polling booths of the country instead of confining them to only some booths. They feel that there is an urgent need to universalize the use of VVPAT in all the polling booths of the country. " According to the current stand of the election commission, the VVPAT are being verified by it in only one polling booth in a constituency. This does not give the accurate picture of the polling held in the entire constituency. If the the application of VVPAT is implemented in every polling booth, then, we will get accurate and exact results without casting any doubt about the voting process. By doing so, we can also put a full stop to to the existing rumors of rigging of votes  and automatic casting of votes to only one party," said senior advocate and BJP Karimnagar district president Kotha  Srinivas Reddy. The member of Telangana State Advocates Welfare Board Boodidha Mallesh also expressed similar views. He said that the country needs comprehensive usage of the VVPAT. " It is a revolutionary technology. This will also satisfy the conscienceless of the voters, who are often   bombarded with several conflicting reports related to the voting process. " Every voter considers his vote as  a tool to transform his life and the conditions of the society and votes accordingly.  He will get complete satisfaction when he is handed over with a slip of VVPAT that consists all the details like the party and the leader he voted for," he noted. 

One reason women are accusing men of sexual harassment in the press, rather than the courts: The legal system that’s thought to investigate, address, and prevent sexual harassment has failed them for decades.

The conclusion from a review of 1,000 above job discrimination cases by two law professors: Sandra Sperino at the University of Cincinnati, and Suja Thomas at the University of Illinois. Sperino and Thomas set out to understand how judges view discrimination cases.

Sexual harassment is illegal in all workplaces and in every state. It's a form of gender discrimination prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and it's illegal whether the assumed perpetrator is a person's co-worker or supervisor. But Sperino and Thomas argue that federal court judges frequently dismiss sexual harassment cases that likely meet the requirements under the law.

In the past 40 years, they say federal judges across the country have developed an extremely tapered explanation of what sexual harassment is under the law, and which behaviors create a hostile work environment. Repetitive groping, sexual propositions, and sexualized comments at work usually don't meet that high standard.

"It's shocking," said Sperino. "You read about women being groped or rubbed against a lot at work, and judges don't think that creates a hostile work environment."

The federal courts have repeatedly dismissed women's well-documented claims of sexual harassment at work - the same kinds of alleged actions that have surfaced in media reports in recent weeks.

That helps explain why less than 2 percent of job discrimination lawsuits - a category that includes sexual harassment - make it to a jury, and why only about 4 percent end up awarding damages to victims.

Many claims never make it to court

The roadblocks to getting justice start with an unusually complicated and strict process to file a complaint against an employer in the first place. 

Employees who think their employer has discriminated against them - including through sexual harassment, which is legally considered sex-based discrimination - have to start by filing a complaint with the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which enforces federal civil rights laws.

Requiring people to go through an administrative agency before filing a lawsuit is highly unusual. In most civil cases, including personal injury or negligence claims, anyone can file a lawsuit in court at any time. Congress also placed a strict time frame on when employees can file job discrimination complaints with the EEOC: no later than 300 days after the alleged discrimination happened. Then the agency has six months to review the case before an employee can sue in court. Once the EEOC gives an employee a Right to Sue notice, they have three months to file a lawsuit.

All through the EEOC's review of the case, the commission investigates and tries to resolve the dispute through mediation. About half the time, investigators are unable to determine if an employer engaged in sexual harassment, and the EEOC notifies workers that they can sue their employer in court. Sometimes the complaints are settled during this process, and sometimes the EEOC will sue the employer in the most serious cases.

In 2016, for example, the EEOC received 6,758 sexual harassment claims, and resolved 23 percent of the cases in favor of employees, adding up to $40 million in relief for workers. In 54 percent of their investigations, EEOC staff was unable to gather enough evidence to determine if harassment occurred. In those cases, employees are given permission to sue in court.

The details of these cases are never made public, unless an employee decides to sue in federal court. And their chances of any success in court are slim.

When victims take their cases to court, the odds are against them

Even if a case gets to court - meaning that the employee went through the six-month EEOC review process and chooses to sue their employer - federal judges dismiss job discrimination claims at a much higher rate than other civil lawsuits.

Only about four out of 100 job discrimination lawsuits that aren’t settled or voluntarily dismissed end up providing any kind of relief for workers, according to Katie Eyer, a law professor at Rutgers.

This is highly unusual in the world of federal litigation, “exceeding the negative outcomes faced by other litigants in both scope and degree,” she wrote in a 2011 Minnesota Law Review Journal article. In other words, the odds are stacked against victims of discrimination more than victims of medical malpractice or consumer fraud, for example.

The high dismissal rates aren’t for lack of evidence. When deciding whether to dismiss a case through synopsis judgment, a judge needs to determine if a reasonable person would consider the alleged actions to be a violation of the law. More often than not, judges don't think the behavior is bad enough or persistent enough to be illegal.

Through their repetitive dismissals, federal judges have narrowed the definition of illegal sexual harassment so much that a woman (or man) would basically have to accuse her boss of rape to present a clear-cut case of illegal sexual harassment.

Federal judges developed a high bar for illegal harassment

The high courts have defined two forms of sexual harassment that are illegal at work. In both, the behavior must be unwelcome to be against the law.

The first is called quid pro quo harassment. In these scenarios, a person in a position of power demands that a subordinate tolerate harassment (like groping and sexual requests) to keep his or her job, or to get a salary raise or other job benefits. These are the most obvious cases and the easiest to prove. It only has to happen once to be illegal.

The second form of illegal harassment is more subjective. It's behavior that is "severe or pervasive" enough to create a hostile work environment for the victim. This is open to interpretation, because there is no definition as to what makes harassment (like groping and sexual requests) severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. Instead, juries and judges are supposed to consider how often the behavior happened, whether it was physical or verbal, whether the perpetrator was a supervisor, whether more than one person participated, and whether a reasonable person would view the behavior as unpleasant.

The second type of case is the one that federal judges are most likely to dismiss, because they might not think someone's actions are all that bad. And when one judge decides that a co-worker's repeated requests for sex don't count as sexual harassment, and if that dismissal is upheld by an appeals court, it creates a legal rationale for other judges to dismiss similar cases.

This is how federal judges created a high bar for what the courts consider harassment that is "severe and pervasive" enough to create a hostile work environment. If they don't believe that someone’s allegation rises to the level of severity, then they can dismiss a case before it goes to trial.

The federal judges do not believe women's claims meet this standard, said Sperino. This is the main reason so few sexual harassment lawsuits go to trial when they aren't settled beforehand, she says.

Here are a few cases that federal judges have dismissed in recent decades because they didn't believe a reasonable person would consider them bad enough to create a hostile work environment. The dismissals were later upheld by the appellate courts, creating legal precedent for other judges to dismiss similar cases.

1. * In one Alabama case, a woman who worked at Blue Cross Blue Shield said her supervisor told her she only had a job was because they "needed a skirt in the office." That same supervisor allegedly asked the woman to spend the night with him at a hotel, asked her to "blow" him, constantly called her "babe," and repeatedly zipped and unzipped his pants in front of her. He also had a habit of referring to women with words like "bitch," "slut," and "tramp." The case was filed and dismissed in the US District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. The dismissal was upheld by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in 2007.
2. 
   
3. *A 911 phone dispatcher for the city of San Mateo, California, said her co-worker touched her stomach and commented on how soft and sexy it was. When she tried to push him away, the co-worker forced his hand underneath her sweater and bra to fondle her breast. He tried again, but stopped when another colleague entered the room. Two other women reported similar harassment from the same employee. The case was filed and dismissed in the US District Court for the Northern District of California. The dismissal was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2000.
4. 
   
5. *At a Coca-Cola bottling plant in Chicago, a woman said her male supervisor repeatedly asked her out on dates, which she declined. He often asked about her personal life and told her how beautiful she was, put his hand on her shoulders at least six times, placed "I love you" signs on her desk, and tried to kiss her three times. The case was filed and dismissed in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The dismissal was upheld by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 1993.
7. 
   
8. *At a construction site in Alabama, a male electrical worker said his supervisor repeatedly made comments about his genitals, talked about raping him, and asked him to "feel his pipe." When the worker complained, his supervisor said there was nothing he could do. The supervisor allegedly made multiple sexual comments a day during the 10 days they worked together. After complaining to another supervisor, and then taking a few days off work, the worker was told he no longer had a job. The case was filed and dismissed in the US District Court for the Southern District of Alabama in 2000.

These cases have been cited as the legal reasoning for dismissing later lawsuits describing similar behavior.

Sperino calls this a "domino effect" that has led judges across the country to throw out other similar cases. "Judges feel compelled to follow these older cases, even though many cases in the ’90s were probably wrongly decided and haven't aged well," she said.

A judge's gender shapes court decisions

In 2016, about two-thirds of federal judges at the trial and appellate court level were male. Twenty years ago, when many sexual harassment cases were first heard, the imbalance was even worse.

This is one reason it’s so hard for victims of sexual harassment to get justice. Research shows that a judge's gender plays a significant role in the outcome of sexual harassment cases. A Yale Law Journal article analyzed more than 500 sexual harassment case appeals in 1999, 2000, and 2001 and concluded that plaintiffs were twice as likely to win their appeal when a female judge was on the bench.

Researchers at the University of Minnesota analyzed 62 studies of how women and men view sexual harassment, and found that women were far more likely to consider a broader range of actions as sexual harassment. Women considered groping and recurring requests for dates to fit the label; men were less likely to think so.

Women were also much more likely to consider dating pressure and physical sexual contact as behavior that creates a hostile work environment. This distinction is important. For a plaintiff to prove they were subjected to illegal harassment, they have to persuade a jury that it created a hostile work environment for them. So it makes sense that a male judge would be more likely to dismiss a case for not meeting that standard than a female judge.

Yet federal judges are supposed to define "severe and pervasive" sexual harassment the way a "reasonable person" on the jury would, not the way they might view it. That is such a subjective standard. Different people have different views about what is reasonable, just as men and women have different views about what behavior creates a toxic work environment.

Federal judges, who are appointed by the president, are overwhelmingly white, male, and from privileged backgrounds. On the other hand, juries represent a wider range of American society.

"Because of these differences, it is possible for a jury to believe the discrimination did occur, while a federal judge may think that discrimination may not have occurred. These differences make it even more important for these disputed cases to be left to juries," Sperino and Thomas write.

Juries rarely get that chance. It's no wonder so many women and men have decided instead to tell their experiences to the press in recent weeks - they have no other option. The justice system has failed to give sexual harassment victims their day in court.