Iraq II: NOT a model for the use of force

A few days ago, on the 30th anniversary of Iraq I, I wrote that Iraq I was a model for the use of force in the world. Iraq had invaded Kuwait, a clear violation of international law. The United Nations Security Council had given a resolution authorizing the use of force, as did the United States Congress. President George H.W. Bush’s action was legal, successful and limited.

Twelve years later his son, President George W. Bush, on March 20, 2003, undertook an invasion of Iraq. It was anything but a model for the use of force. It was of creative legality, successful but not limited. It was, however, I believe, defensively rational. Sometimes a president has to go beyond the law.

Iraq I had ended with Security Council Resolution 687, which required Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein, to get rid of his weapons of mass destruction (herein, WMD), i.e., chemical, biological and nuclear. This was the condition for a cease fire. The process would be monitored under the authority of the Security Council. Saddam was thus coerced into accepting the penetration of Iraqi sovereignty. He did not take it well; finally, in 1998, he removed the international weapons inspectors. This was a clear defiance of Security Council authority. It also left the world nearly blind regarding his WMD capacity.

Then, 911 occurred in 2001. The threat of terrorism with WMD on the homeland became America’s foremost concern. We could not rely on deterrence, as we had during the Cold War; these people were willing to die. We needed actual defense. Our greatest fear was that a terrorist, armed with WMD, in a crowded city could kill untold numbers of Americans. Regarding Iraq, our concern was that anti-American Saddam could transfer WMD to anti-American terrorists.

Even if this were a small probability, when combined with a terrible possible outcome (the death of thousands of Americans in the homeland), it became an unacceptable risk. We would be compelled to invade Iraq unless Saddam complied with the Security Council inspections. It would be a compulsion to war.

Now, Saddam would have to come clean regarding his WMD. The Security Council passed Resolution 1441; it gave Iraq 30 days to produce a declaration of all of his WMD. The Resolution concluded: “…Iraq…will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.” When Saddam produced his Declaration, the United States was not impressed, to say the least.

President Bush went to the Security Council to get specific authorization to use force. Security Council members France, Russia and Germany said no; France and Russia had the veto. They wanted to give Saddam more time. Our Ambassador to the United Nations withdrew the American-proposed resolution on March 17, 2003. President Bush invaded Iraq a few days later on March 20, 2003, without Security Council authorization. In fact, the intent of the Security Council was no.

The United States had a legal argument, part of which relied on Resolution 1441 language above referring to “serious consequences,” but that does not rise to “all necessary means,” which is the Security Council language for use of force. And Article 51 self-defense could not be stretched so far as to include the invasion of a nation. The Congressional authorization President Bush had could not alter the limits of international law.

A content analysis of President Bush’s autobiography, Decision Points, in the relevant part shows that his leading reason for going to war was self-defense. I believe he invaded Iraq to protect the American people from WMD which Saddam could have given to terrorists, if he had had any.

No WMD were found. President Bush wrote: “No one was more shocked or angry than I was when we didn’t find the weapons. I had a sickening feeling every time I thought about it. I still do.”

James Pfister, J.D. University of Toledo, Ph.D. University of Michigan (political science), retired after 46 years in the Political Science Department at Eastern Michigan University. He lives in Addison and can be reached at jpfister@emich.edu.